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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

CONFIDENTIAL

8 MAY 1974

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TRENDS

In Communist Propaganda

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ARAB-ISRAELI ISSUE

USSR MIDEAST ROLE STRESSED AS GROMYKO SEES KISSINGER, SYRIANS

Moscow has continued its efforts to increase its visibility in Mideast diplomacy by timing another Gromyko visit to Damascus to coincide with Secretary Kissinger's fifth visit to the area,* and by publicizing Gromyko's talks with Kissinger in Geneva on 28-29 April and in Cyprus on 7 May. Consistent with its treatment of Kissinger's last visit to the area in February-March, Moscow gave minimal coverage to the Secretary's peregrinations in Egypt, Israel, Syria and Jordan. Some accounts--primarily in Arabic--contrived to cast doubt on the possibility of Kissinger achieving Israeli-Syrian disengagement. They cited unidentified observers as saying that he probably would not be able to achieve disengagement during the present tour, and they noted, in connection with his talks in Israel, that Tel Aviv continued to refuse to withdraw from the Golan Heights, particularly from al-Qunaytirah.

GROMYKO-KISSINGER TALKS There has been little followup comment on the Middle East aspect of the Kissinger-Gromyko talks in Geneva, but PRAVDA's Kolesnichenko, in a review reported in an English-language broadcast on the 6th, called for "broad-based cooperation" between the Soviet Union and the United States as a precondition for solving the Middle East crisis. Echoing the language of the joint report on the Geneva meeting, the review noted that Gromyko and Kissinger had agreed to maintain close contacts in coordinating their efforts to achieve a settlement. The review observed that this approach to the problem "provides a real chance for peace."

At the same time, a commentary in Arabic on the 5th underscored the "elementary differences" between the Soviet position of seeking a just overall settlement and the U.S. position of being the main power supporting Israel. A foreign-language commentary by Rassadin on the 5th reiterated previous Soviet assertions that "U.S. imperialist circles" and "those circles" in the Arab world trying to disrupt Soviet-Arab friendship were playing into the hands of the "Israeli aggressors."

* During his last visit to the Middle East, which overlapped Secretary Kissinger's fourth tour of the area, Gromyko visited Cairo (1-5 March) as well as Damascus (27 February-1 March, 5-7 March).

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Moscow thus far has offered no comment on the Kissinger-Gromyko meeting in Nicosia on 7 May other than to publicize the brief report on the meeting, which said that along with questions pertaining to Soviet-U.S. relations, the two sides discussed the Middle East situation, including the matter of Syrian-Israeli disengagement "as part of the general problem" of a Middle East settlement.

GROMYKO IN SYRIA Moscow was predictably uninformative in its treatment of Gromyko's 5-7 May official visit to Syria. Other than Gromyko's brief, stereotyped arrival and departure remarks--in which he noted that disengagement had been discussed and expressed satisfaction with the visit--no speeches were reported. TASS did say that "brief welcoming speeches" were exchanged at Foreign Minister Khaddam's luncheon on the 6th, but gave no indication of any speeches at President al-Asad's dinner the previous day.

The short concluding document on the visit--described by TASS as a "report" and by Damascus as a "press statement"--declared that peace in the area must be based on Israeli withdrawal from the lands occupied since the June 1967 war and on a guarantee of the Palestinians' lawful national rights. The same points were made in the joint statement following President al-Asad's Moscow visit last month. Like the earlier statement, the present one again affirmed that disengagement must be considered a step toward a comprehensive solution and total Israeli withdrawal. The report on the visit said that Gromyko affirmed the USSR's "resolute" support for Syria's position on disengagement--support earlier declared by Brezhnev in his 11 April speech at a dinner for al-Asad.

Gromyko's talks, according to the report on the visit, were held in an atmosphere of "friendship and mutual understanding," the same characterization used in describing the al-Asad talks in Moscow last month. In addition to his two meetings with al-Asad, and talks with the Syrian prime minister and foreign minister, Gromyko again met with Palestine Liberation Organization chairman 'Arafat, as he had in both Cairo and Damascus during his last visit to the area. According to TASS on the 6th, Gromyko and 'Arafat discussed, in a "warm friendly atmosphere," questions of a Mideast settlement and of securing the Palestinians' national rights. There was no report that Gromyko met with officials of the Syrian Communist Party, as he had done on his previous visit.

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Following Gromyko's return to Moscow on the 7th after his talks in Cyprus with Kissinger, Damascus radio reported on the 8th that al-Asad had received the Soviet ambassador, who conveyed to him a message from Brezhnev.

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EUROPE

MOSCOW TERSE ON BRANDT RESIGNATION; GDR SCOFFS AT SPY CASE

Reflecting obvious surprise and concern over the sudden resignation of FRG Chancellor Brandt on 6 May, Moscow has avoided extensive comment on the reasons for the move or its implications, confining its coverage mainly to selective replays of Western news reports and comment. Although Moscow reported briefly on the Guillaume spy case prior to the resignation, it has not mentioned it since. By its silence on this issue and by its selective reporting, Moscow has suggested that the true causes for the resignation are internal FRG political and economic difficulties. Stressing this latter theme, East Berlin has been quick to assert that the Guillaume case was just a pretext for Brandt's resignation. Other East European comment has also played the domestic difficulties theme, along with the suggestion that Brandt's domestic political opponents and the FRG intelligence services had conspired to force Brandt out of office.

MOSCOW Moscow's limited reportage thus far has been restricted to a few terse, factual TASS reports, the substance of which has been publicized by Moscow radio and in the central press. The initial TASS report, early on the 7th, noted that Brandt had resigned and had asked President Heinemann to appoint Vice Chancellor Scheel as acting chancellor. In the evening hours of the 7th TASS carried a brief summary of that day's events which suggested that the main lines of Brandt's policies would probably be continued by his successors. TASS noted that Helmut Schmidt's nomination for chancellor had been proposed by Brandt. It cited SPD deputy chairman Heinz Kuehn as saying that the SPD-FDP coalition would continue. TASS on the 8th, in a dispatch from Bonn, observed that West German commentators had noted that the "basic causes" for Brandt's decision were "rooted in difficulties of a domestic political nature" and it cited Bonn spokesman von Wechmar as saying that Brandt's resignation would not affect FRG foreign policy.

Although, Moscow has not mentioned the Guillaume spy case since Brandt's resignation, an article in IZVESTIYA on the 5th, commenting on the controversy in West Germany over the exchange of permanent missions between the FRG and the GDR, asserted that the "latest pretext for anticommunist hysteria was the recent arrest of an aide in the chancellor's office on suspicion of espionage." The article declared that the CDU/CSU leaders were using this spy case "as a convenient opportunity for fresh attacks on the GDR."

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THE GDR East German comment has charged that Brandt over-reacted to the Guillaume case and that the "real reasons" for his resignation were the internal economic and political difficulties of the Federal Republic. East Berlin did not comment directly on the arrest of Guillaume until 2 May, when NEUES DEUTSCHLAND carried a lengthy editorial which charged that the arrest "of a member" of the chancellor's staff was the signal for a "witch hunt" by the Bonn opposition, whose victims would include the "present government itself." While the editorial did not acknowledge directly that Guillaume was a GDR spy, avoiding mention of his name entirely, it repeatedly declared that FRG-GDR relations should not be dependent on such "more or less marginal events" as the activities of the two countries' respective intelligence services. It went on to cite the West German SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG for the view that the arrest of the chancellor's assistant "does not alter the basic premises of the relations between the two German states." The editorial concluded by calling for additional steps to be taken toward normalizing relations between the GDR and FRG.

A GDR Foreign Ministry spokesman on the 7th, according to ADN and TASS, said "the events" in Bonn were an "internal FRG affair." Acknowledging that GDR leaders have "repeatedly expressed their appreciation for the realistic" aspects of Brandt's foreign policy, the spokesman added that the new FRG Government will be expected to "make a constructive contribution to implementing the system of treaties concluded and to thereby promote peace and security in Europe." GDR President Stoph, in the main speech on the 7th at a ceremony honoring the 29th anniversary of the victory over Hitler, made no mention of either the Guillaume case or Brandt's resignation, according to ADN's report of his speech.

GDR comment following Brandt's resignation replayed the themes of the NEUES DEUTSCHLAND editorial. An ADN dispatch from Bonn on the 7th bluntly stated that there was "no compelling reason" for Brandt's resignation, adding that it was "superfluous and resulted from a misjudgment of the situation." Asserting that these judgments were shared by Western observers, the ADN correspondent declared that the Guillaume "affair" was nothing more than "a mere excuse" for Brandt's resignation.

OTHER EAST EUROPEAN
REACTION

Displaying skepticism that the Guillaume case was the real reason for Brandt's resignation, Prague and Budapest have commented at length on the domestic economic and political reasons for Brandt's decision. For example, Prague took a slap at East

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Berlin when a Czechoslovak radio official, appearing on Prague television on the 7th, labeled the Guillaume case "a kind of distasteful espionage affair."

Zagreb radio commentator Milika Sundic drew the conclusion that the harm done to Europe by the spy case would outweigh the usefulness of the information supplied by Guillaume to his "protectors" in the GDR and "the socialist camp as a whole." Warsaw's German specialist Ryszard Wojna, in a television commentary on the 7th and an article in the party daily TRYBUNA LUDU on the 8th, heaped glowing praise on Brandt for his efforts in bringing about the Warsaw-Bonn treaty and noted favorably that, with the confirmation that the Bonn coalition government would continue, the "possibility" for normalizing relations between Poland and the FRG has not changed. Sofia, Bucharest, and Tirana have reported Brandt's resignation without comment.

MOSCOW SEES BOTH FRENCH CANDIDATES COMMITTED TO DETENTE

In initial comment on the results of the 5 May first-stage balloting in the French presidential elections, Moscow has suggested that it finds little difference between the foreign policy orientations of the two run-off candidates. Noting that both Mitterrand and Giscard d'Estaing have indicated in recent speeches that they would conduct a foreign policy aimed at continuing international detente and the development of relations with the socialist countries, Moscow has thus continued to show the reserved and noncommittal attitude it displayed during the period of preliminary electioneering.*

Despite its presumed stake in the success of a communist-backed candidate, Moscow has so far avoided any outright show of partisanship on Mitterrand's behalf. A commentary by political observer A. Potapov, for instance, carried over Moscow domestic service on 6 May, served merely to throw into sharp relief Moscow's lack of enthusiastic endorsement of Mitterrand. Potapov had no particular words of praise for Mitterrand, noting merely that his electoral support had been one million votes more than the leftist parties had received in the 1973 parliamentary elections. Moreover, Potapov seemed to assume the attitude of a mere interested bystander in observing; on the basis of French press reports, that the next stage would be "a fierce duel" in which "anything could still happen."

* See the TRENDS of 17 April 1974, page 19.

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Whereas Moscow evidently believes its interests are best served by continuing a low-keyed, hands-off approach to the elections, East European comment has been markedly more partisan in supporting Mitterrand and in drawing far-reaching inferences from his successes to date. The review of the Warsaw press, carried by PAP on 7 May, saw "signs that an important turning point in France's political life may be in the offing" and referred to the possibility of a "broad democratic majority" to include socialists and communists. The East German NATIONAL-ZEITUNG on 7 May interpreted the first-round balloting as a reflection of the "regrouping of forces" allegedly occurring in recent years in France and reflected in the joint political program of the leftist parties.

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SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

MOSCOW STEPS UP PRESSURE OVER HELICOPTER INCIDENT

The 14 March Chinese capture and detention of a Soviet helicopter and crew has received increased attention in Soviet media during the last 10 days, with a new protest from the foreign ministry as well as comment carried in the central press and by TASS. Initially, Moscow played the incident in low key and did not acknowledge that there had been a Soviet foreign ministry protest on 15 March until the 28th; when a second protest referred to the earlier one in passing. The protest of the 28th--delivered to the Chinese both in Moscow and Peking--"insisted" on the return of the crew and categorically rejected Peking's charges of 23 March that the helicopter was on a reconnaissance mission.

According to TASS, on 2 May Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Leonid Ilichev read a statement to the Chinese ambassador which repeated the above assertions in the 28 March statement but went on to warn that Peking must "assume full responsibility for the inevitable consequences" of further detention of the crew. The warning of "consequences" was also voiced in the 21 January 1974 protest over Peking's arrest and expulsion of five Soviet diplomats*--the first formal protest since a ship collision in 1971. Such warnings were routine fare in protest notes during the late 1960's.

Four days before the latest note, a lengthy report in the 28 April PRAVDA eschewed tendentious commentary while presenting Moscow's version of events. Following its 2 May note, however, Moscow's public reticence showed signs of ending. On 7 May TASS carried a commentary by its observer Yuriy Kornilov, and on the 8th it carried a lengthy summary of a LITERARY GAZETTE article berating the Chinese over the incident. Kornilov briefly echoed official Soviet statements, adding that Peking's actions are "a crying violation of generally accepted norms of international law" designed to give "new impetus" to its anti-Soviet campaign. Moscow radio began rebroadcasting the Kornilov commentary in Mandarin and other languages on 7 May.

PEKING Peking ignored the latest Soviet protest, as it had the 28 March Soviet foreign ministry note. The Chinese responded in low key in the weeks following their 23 March protest

* For an analysis of exchanges relating to the diplomatic expulsion, see the TRENDS of 23 January 1974, pages 11-13.

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over the incident, virtually avoiding central media coverage of the issue. This contrasted with the full play Peking had given in January to the capture and expulsion of Soviet diplomats on spying charges. The helicopter incident became the focus of several Sinkiang local rallies in late March and early April which were reported only in provincial broadcasts and which seemed designed as much to stir up fervor for the current Chinese domestic campaign against Lin Biao as to denounce Moscow's spying. Peking media's sole reference to the incident since the formal PRC protest came in a 4 April Peking radio broadcast, not carried by NCNA, which referred in passing to the helicopter intrusion as the latest in a long list of recent Soviet international espionage activities.

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CHINA

CHOU SAYS THIRD WORLD STRUGGLE HAS REACHED "NEW STAGE"

Premier Chou En-lai, speaking at a 6 May banquet for visiting Senegalese President Senghor, dramatized earlier Chinese characterizations of the UNGA special session on raw materials when he said that it has shown that the third world struggle against the superpowers has reached a "new stage--a stage of deep-going development." Vice Premier Teng Hsiao-ping in his major UN address on 10 April* had hailed the session as showing that the developing world is the "main force" opposing the superpowers, and PEOPLE'S DAILY editorials marking the conclave had observed that the session demonstrated a "new situation."

Chou's remarks further enhance his public image as Peking's leading spokesman directing the recent shift in Chinese foreign policy toward a more pronounced identification with third world interests against the United States and Soviet Union. Especially since Chinese leadership consultations with visiting Algerian President Boumedienne in late February, following his call for the UNGA special session, Peking leaders headed by Chou have been at pains to convince visiting third world leaders of Chinese support for their cause. Chou was the first Chinese leader to allude, in a 24 March banquet address for the visiting Tanzanian President, to a new Mao instruction testifying to Peking's determination not to betray Marxism by failing to assist oppressed peoples abroad.

Chou's remarks also provided evidence that even though Peking is presently preoccupied with stressing its anti-superpower credentials, it will not reverse its flexible, differentiated approach toward the United States and the USSR. The premier notably softened criticism of the United States while lashing out at Soviet behavior at the UN session, behavior he described as "especially despicable." This kind of distinction was also drawn in other authoritative Chinese comment on the session. NCNA reportage on Secretary Kissinger's address at the meeting was atypically critical, but this criticism was not repeated in authoritative media.

* For a discussion of Teng's address and PRC comment leading up to the UN session, see the TRENDS of 17 April 1974, pages 1-4.

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Though Chou was glowingly positive regarding the course of third world struggle during the UN session, other authoritative comment has been careful to insert a note of caution regarding future prospects. A 5 May PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial marking the end of the session noted that developing nations' struggle against superpower exploitation will be "protracted and arduous." PRC UN representative Huang Hua also warned in a 1 May address that "a long process of arduous struggle" by the developing nations would be necessary in order to reverse the existing world economic framework.

4 MAY RALLIES STRESS PARTY LEADERSHIP OF YOUTHFUL ACTIVISM

Peking used the occasion of the 55th anniversary of the 4 May Movement, a massive protest movement by Chinese youth in 1919 against imperialism and China's traditional culture, to issue a new call for youth to play a larger role as assistants to the party in the struggle against Lin Piao and Confucius. The call for youths to widen their role in the anti-Confucius campaign was contained in an authoritative PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial pegged to the anniversary which argued that criticism of Lin and Confucius cannot be done by "relying on a few people." It specifically called upon educated youth and students throughout the country to join with the workers and peasants and "form a mighty army" under the party's leadership to criticize Lin. Recalling a passage from a speech by Mao, the editorial asserted that it is only with a "force of hundreds of millions of people" that the enemy's "last fortress" can be smashed.

Reports on provincial rallies marking the anniversary serve to underscore Peking's resolve, however, to prevent any return to the chaotic conditions and the freewheeling attacks of youthful Red Guards during the late 1960's. The rally reports make it clear that, unlike the stormy cultural revolution period, Chinese youths now are not empowered to roam from province to province dragging out errant party officials. Instead, they have clear instructions to follow their local unified party leadership and avoid getting entangled in factional disputes.

The proper pattern youths should follow to deepen their role in the anti-Lin struggle was outlined in greatest detail in a 4 May Shanghai report on a local youth meeting marking the anniversary at the stadium of Shanghai's No. 17 cotton mill, Wang Hung-wen's old base. The report focused on the need for young activists to be "good assistants of the party" and warned that without party leadership the youth movement would "lose its bearings, suffer setbacks and incur losses."

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Limiting the scope of the popular revolutionary slogan calling on youths to challenge policies deemed incorrect by "going against the tide," the Shanghai report stressed that youths must unite with the majority and go "against the tide under the leadership of the party committee." However, some leeway for youth to influence party decisions was reflected in the report, which drew a line between legitimate and illegitimate authority within the party. Youths were given the mission to obey the leadership that implements the "correct line," and to oppose the leadership that implements an "incorrect line." Youth groups throughout Shanghai were also advised to assist the party by offering suggestions to party organizations, and not to wait "passively for orders and instructions."

In an apparent effort to avoid possible overzealous interpretations of the role of youth in the anti-Confucius campaign, reports on other provincial rallies have revealed further limitations on activism. Chengchow's 4 May report on its local rally specifically noted that youths must remain at their production posts, make revolution "locally," and only during their "spare time." Similarly, Nanning radio on 4 May stressed the role of party leadership over the youth movement and also noted that revolution should be made during "spare time" and "on the spot" to help meet the goals of the 1974 national economic plan.

PRC MEDIA RENEW ATTENTION TO WORKER PROPAGANDA TEAMS

Paralleling the 4 May youth day calls stressing party leadership and discipline, there has been a recent revival of media attention to worker propaganda teams. The worker teams were sent to schools in 1968 to end Red Guard anarchy and carry out educational reforms. Following the cultural revolution, however, the teams apparently were gradually reduced to figureheads in many schools.

The revival of worker teams is in keeping with the current stress on worker participation in the anti-Lin campaign and with indications that trade unions are assuming a major role in the struggle. At the same time it assures that workers under tight party control--rather than revolutionary youth--form the backbone of the struggle, a move which seems calculated to prevent the campaign against Lin Biao and Confucius from slipping into the anarchy that arose during the cultural revolution.

A 26 April Honan broadcast revealed that in the spring of 1972, when the struggle against Lin was taking the form of a broad attack on ultraleftism, worker propaganda teams were relegated to routine

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administrative tasks by those seeking to improve teaching quality, and an unsuccessful attempt was even made to expel the teams from schools on the grounds that they were "factionalists." A Hunan broadcast on the same day reported a decision to send propaganda teams to various units throughout the province, not just educational institutions. The decision, by the provincial revolutionary committee's leadership group for worker Mao Tse-tung thought propaganda teams, called on teams to enter all culture, education and public health units. The call was echoed by Liaoning province the following day, suggesting that a central directive had been issued on the topic.

On 29 April PRC central media picked up the theme, with an NCNA domestic service account revealing that additional worker propaganda team units had been sent to all local institutes of higher education and that they had positioned themselves in the leading body of each department in every institution. The teams do not replace party leadership, but do have a say in party decisions. The NCNA report provided an example in which the party committee of a Peking institute attached "great importance" to team opinions and consequently adopted new measures. Similarly, a 7 May NCNA account of educational revolution victories in Shenyang revealed that the secretaries of two local school party branches also head the school's propaganda teams.

PEKING ARTICLE PRAISES, BUT LIMITS, REVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLE

A "recent" PEKING DAILY article--written by the criticism group of Peking and Tsinghua universities and excerpted by NCNA on 7 May--dwelt upon the achievements and problems of the cultural revolution period to make clear that the current ideological campaign must be carried out under controlled conditions. The article was effusive in its praise for cultural revolution achievements, the "new things" which must be defended from attack, but it clearly differentiated the Maoist cultural revolutionary mainstream from attempts by Lin Piao to "shift the direction of the struggle" and "hit the whole party, army and proletariat."

The target of the article's attacks is Lin's attempt to struggle against institutions, rather than the relatively few erring individuals. The article specifically criticized Lin for fomenting attacks on "the party in power," on "those who made revolution," and for trying to "drag out the handful in the army."

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It also accused him of disrupting Mao's principle of promoting both revolution and production by splitting the revolutionary ranks and inciting "armed conflicts." This recital of Lin's errors seems designed to warn people that such crimes will not be tolerated in the current struggle.

The PEKING DAILY article characterizes those who called Lin's crimes "ultraleftist" as "a handful of class enemies, Lin Piao's sworn followers included." In so doing, the article ignores the historical record which shows that some of China's current leaders, most notably Chiang Ching, were less careful about employing such designations in the past. In Chiang Ching's most famous speech, her 5 September 1967 address advising Red Guards that they must not resort to violent struggle, she noted that opposition to the Maoist line was then coming from "the left, extreme left and right." Among the types of opposition she then enumerated were the calls--now attributed to Lin--to drag out the handful in the army and in the party.

Unlike many of the charges against Lin, the accusation that he was behind the call to drag out the handful in the army may have some validity. The slogan was sounded several times during the first half of 1967 in LIBERATION ARMY DAILY editorials, before it was given wider currency in RED FLAG articles for a brief period following the Wuhan military mutiny in late July 1967. According to Red Guard sources, Lin positively assessed the results of the mutiny, in a speech he delivered on 9 August 1967. He was quoted as saying that the mutiny had "turned into a very good thing", and implied that this incident would provide an opportunity to move into several military regions about which "we have been somewhat uneasy." He reportedly further noted that military units must be taught to treat revolutionaries properly and listen to their opinions.

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VIETNAM

GIAP ADDRESSES DIEN BIEN PHU RALLY, RESUMES ACTIVE PUBLIC ROLE

Following his reappearance at a 30 April May Day meeting after an unexplained absence of nearly seven months, Defense Minister Vo Nguyen Giap seems to have resumed his customary active role as foremost representative of the DRV military.* Hanoi reported that Giap on 5 May voted in people's council elections, on the 6th delivered a public address on the 20th anniversary of Dien Bien Phu, and on the 7th reviewed the 1954 battle in a Hanoi television talk.

The Defense Minister's 6 May speech was delivered at a "grand meeting" to mark the Dien Bien Phu anniversary, attended by Politburo members Truong Chinh, Nguyen Duy Trinh, and Van Tien Dung, as well as members of DRV mass organizations, the army, and the diplomatic corps. A similar meeting on the 10th anniversary in 1964, also addressed by Giap, prompted a higher-level leadership turnout that included Ho Chi Minh, First Secretary Le Duan, and Premier Pham Van Dong. Only twice since 1964 has the anniversary been marked with meetings--in 1965 and 1969--and these were not addressed by Giap.

Following perfunctory opening remarks by Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh, Giap expounded on the historic impact of Dien Bien Phu. He characterized it as the "do-or-die strategic battle" of "decisive significance for the overall military and political situation in the Indochina war theater and for the successful outcome of the Geneva conference," and as "an epochal turning point in the Vietnamese revolution." The 1972 general offensive, by "giving full play to the Dien Bien Phu tradition," according to Giap, was "decisive for the great victory of the anti-U.S. war" and "forced" the United States to sign the Paris agreement and pull its troops out of Vietnam.

In his brief remarks on the economic situation in the North, Giap not unexpectedly emphasized the military aspects of reconstruction. He urged a consolidation of national defense potential and a combining of economic tasks with related national defense tasks to

* Giap's reappearance is discussed in the TRENDS of 1 May 1974, pages 1-2.

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transform the "socialist North into a powerful country both in the economic and national defense fields." In turn, Giap pledged that the armed forces will "actively take part in economic construction and the building of socialism."

DRV PEOPLE'S COUNCIL ELECTIONS DRAW LARGE LEADERSHIP TURNOUT

Hanoi media have prominently featured the appearances of leading officials voting in the countrywide elections held on 5 May for provincial, municipal, and regional people's councils--the local governing bodies directly below the national level.* Of the currently active members of the Politburo, only First Secretary Le Duan and Vice Premier Le Thanh Nghi were unaccounted for in reports on the voting. According to Hanoi radio, President Ton Duc Thang, Truong Chinh, Pham Van Dong, Le Duc Tho, Nguyen Duy Trinh, Hoang Van Hoan, and the seldom-mentioned Tran Quoc Hoan all cast their ballots at local polling stations in Hanoi. The two military members of the Politburo, senior generals Vo Nguyen Giap and Van Tien Dung, were said to have voted at the "office of the Ministry of National Defense." Neither Giap nor Dung has been mentioned in similar reports of voting in recent years.

The recently deposed chairman of the Central Agricultural Commission, Hoang Anh, was also reported as having voted and was identified with his remaining titles of secretary of the party Central Committee and vice premier.** Tran Huu Duc, one of three new vice premiers announced in a 2 April National Assembly Standing Committee communique that also indicated he would be in charge of the "internal affairs bloc," was reported to have led a government delegation to inspect voting activities "at several polling stations inside and outside Hanoi."***

* While DRV National Assembly elections were suspended during the war years, until 1971, Hanoi has held elections for people's councils on a regular schedule. According to the DRV constitution, people's councils for autonomous zones, provinces, and cities under central jurisdiction are elected every three years, and councils at the village and district level are elected every two years.

** For a discussion of Hoang Anh's removal and other shifts in government personnel, see the TRENDS of 1 May 1974, pages 2-3.

*** See the TRENDS of 10 April 1974, pages S1-S3.

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In the last election for people's councils "directly under the central authority" in April 1971, President Ton Duc Thang and Premier Pham Van Dong were the only top leaders whose voting activity was reported by Hanoi media; however, First Secretary Le Duan was in Moscow at the time. In 1968, President Ho Chi Minh, Vice President Ton Duc Thang, Le Duan, and Truong Chinh were cited as having voted; and in 1965, the same four leaders plus Pham Van Dong were listed.

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PEKING ON CAMBODIAN ANNIVERSARY: Peking's recent downplaying of its relations with Cambodian Prince Sihanouk's front and government has continued with the failure, for the first time, to mark the fourth anniversary of the 5 May formation of the government with the release of a congratulatory message. Peking's only reference to the 5 May RGNU anniversary was in an NCNA report of a 5 May AKI article. In 1971 and 1972 messages from Chou En-lai were publicized, and last year the media carried a message from PRC Acting Chairman Tung Pi-wu and Chou En-lai to Sihanouk and his prime minister, Penn Nouth--which strove to enhance the role of Sihanouk in the wake of his March 1973 visit to Cambodia. Peking's total silence on any official greeting on the RGNU anniversary comes on the heels of limited publicity for congratulatory messages on the fourth anniversaries of the Cambodian Front (in March) and of the Indochinese summit (in April). The messages on those occasions were not carried in PEOPLE'S DAILY or by NCNA, and Peking radio carried them only in broadcasts to Southeast Asia.

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APPENDIX

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 29 APRIL - 5 MAY 1974

<u>Moscow (2335 items)</u>			<u>Peking (746 items)</u>		
May Day	(1%)	22%	May Day	(--)	16%
China	(4%)	7%	UNGA Special Session	(20%)	9%
[USSR Foreign	(--)	2%]	PRC-Gabon Diplomatic	(--)	7%
Ministry Protest			Relations		
on 14 March Heli-			Criticism of Liu Piao	(6%)	5%
copter Incident			and Confucius		
Supreme Soviet	(5%)	7%	Indochina	(13%)	5%
Elections			[Cambodian Front	(6%)	3%]
Komsomol Congress	(27%)	5%	Leaders in East		
Kissinger-Gromyko	(--)	4%	Europe, Algeria		
Talks in Geneva,			4 May Movement, 55th	(--)	4%
28-29 April			Anniversary		
UNGA Special Session	(1%)	4%	North Yemen Delegation	(--)	4%
Portuguese Coup	(1%)	3%	in PRC		
Aftermath					
Arab-Israeli Issue	(3%)	2%			

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.